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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2-2(3)(i),

Utah Code Annotated, as amended*

ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW
(1) Did appellants sustain and prove recoverable cause-°faction damages by reason of appellees1 overlapping mineral filing?
(2) Were appellants, acting as pro se litigants, therebybarred from recovering the reasonable value of legal and related
services, and other expenses incurred, as damages, in clearing the
title to their mining claims?
(3) Are appellants entitled to recover, as damages, the
reasonable value of their pro se legal services and other expenses
on this appeal?
Except for a review of several factual matters pertaining
to damages in Issue (1), the other two issues question whether
appellants are barred from recovering cause-of-action damages by
reason of their pro se appearance in this case (and" on this appeal)*
It will require an analysis and an interpretation of the
Utah case of Smith v. Batchelor (1992), 832 P* 2d 467, both m t h in the context of the factual and legal situation presented in
that case, as well as a determination of the scope and extent of
the broad—and somewhat gratuitous—statement enunciated in that
case, which, if interpreted in the manner adopted by the trial cotrrt
in this case, would bar an attorney-litigant from recovering both
as a successful party (on the substantive cause of action) and for

-1-

services performed in litigat ing and securing that recovery (procedurally); and, further,
If in this appeal the trial court's all-inclusive interpretation of the pro-se-litigant rule of Smith v, Batchelor should.be
adopted, it will be necessary for this Court to reconcile that
broad interpretation with Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7
(due process of law), Section 11 (the right to pursue a civil case
pro se) and Section 24 (equal protection of the laws), together with
the guarantee of those basic constitutional rights against state
action as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.
MfEKMIMATITE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Two related sections of Utah's mining law are of importance
in understanding the basic cause of action involved in this litigation.

They are contained in Utah Code Anno,, 1953* as amended:

40-1-2•

Discovery monument—Notice of Location—Contents.

The locator at the time of making the discovery of such vein
or lode must erect a monument at the place of discovery, and
post thereon his notice of location, which shall contain:
(5) If a placer or millsite claim, the number of acres
or superficial feet claimed, and such a description of the claim
or mill site, located by reference to some natural object or permanent monument, as will identify the claim or mill site.
40-1-3•

Boundaries to be marked.

Mining claims and mill site? must be distinctly marked on the
ground so that the boundaries thereof can be readily traced.

-2-

The ultimate and overriding authority in this matter is the
provision of Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 11, pertaining to the
right of pro se litigants to appear in court in their own behalf:
Sec* ll* (Courts open—Redress of injuries.)
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party*
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is a case where pro se litigants were denied recovery

for cause-of-action damages in a slander-of-title action involving mining claims solely because one of the pro se plaintiffs was
an attorney.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court*
A non-jury trial was held in this matter on February 23$

1993$ wherein appellants sought punitive and compensatory damages
against appellees. Appellants1 damages evidence, furnished by
Glen E. Fuller, an attorney and quarry operator-owner, consisted
primarily of cash outlays and time spent by him in removing the
cloud of appellees1 mining claim, which overlapped portions of
two mining claims belonging to appellants that had been worked
for 37 years.
The trial court denied punitive damages; also, it denied compensatory damages because they consisted in part of the reasonable
value of services performed by an attorney acting as a pro se
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plaintiff*
The Complaint was dismissed with prejudice•

This appeal

followed.
C.

Statement of Facts.
Appellants located a building stone mining claim (Exh. P-2)

on a large deposit of blue-green (turquoise-colored) quartzite
stone in a mountainous area of Box Elder County in 1955 (R* 085)•
Subsequently, in 1962 they located a contiguous millsite claim
(Exh. P-3) upon which were constructed a crushing plant (with bins),
storage yard, loading clocks, concrete rock bins, equipment garages,
and a cabin.

The two claims encompassed 75*379 acres (R» 005)1 ac-

cording to the official U.S. Mineral Survey, and both were located
in the NWft and the W# of the NEK of Section 18, Tp. 13 N., R. 13 W.,
Salt Lake Base & Meridian, U.S. Survey,
filed in

The Notices of Location

the Box Elder County Recorder's Office (Exhs. P-2 and

P -3) and with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in Salt Lake
City (Exhs. P-ll and P-12) all expressly stated that portions of
both claims were located in the NEK of Section 18, as well as in
the NWft of Section 18.
On Sept. 14, 1991 $ appellants entered into a Quarry Sales
Agreement (Exh. P-4) with Northern Stone Supply, Inc., of Oakley,
Idaho, covering the two mining claims, improvements and equipment.
Paragraph VI of the Agreement specified that, upon making the
three required payments, appellants would convey title to the
buyer—
"with warranties of good and sufficient title and without
any encumbrances existing thereon;11

-4~

At the time the Agreement was being finalized and during the
course of a title examination, appellants discovered that appellees
had recorded a building stone mining claim (Exh. P-5) on the W)£
of the NEK (80 acres) of Section 18 in the Box Elder County Recorder's Office on April 2, 1990. Appellees1 claim included the
SE corner (and claim monument) of appellants1 Turquoise Stone Placer
claim and almost all of their Turquoise Stone Millsite Claim (R. 002),
including all of the improvements located thereon.

(Exhs. P-1 & P-6)

From Sept. 19 through Sept. 26, 1991, appellants, Kim G. Fuller,
and three surveyors engaged by Northern Stone Supply, Inc. carefully examined all of the 80 acres covered by appellees1 Boulder
Haven No. 1 building stone claim (R. 91-92$ 98, 139) , but they
found no evidence that appellees had erected any Notice of Location
on the land nor had they monumented any of the corners of their
purported claim.
Appellees' Answer to the Complaint (R. 013) and William
Bown's letter to appellants dated Feb. 5* 1992 both asserted that
their mining claim was "valid" (Exh. P-8), but on interrogation at
trial William Bown admitted that their claim had not been monumented
in any manner as required by law. K i m

G#

Puller als0 testifled

that

his inspection of the area enclosed within appellees1 purported
claim did not reveal monumentation of any kind*
On Jan.24, 1992, appellants mailed four certified letters
(Exh. P-7) to appellees demanding they immediately remove the
cloud of the Boulder Haven No. 1 from appellants1 claims and that
they be furnished with documentary proof of their actions. William Bown responded by letter on behalf of appellees on Feb. 5*

-5-

1992, admitting the overlap upon appellants1 valid claims, but
stating that the overlap was accidental, mistaken and unintentional
and that "appropriate proceedures have begun which will restore
your claims to their prior, and proper status."

The final sentence

of the body of the letter departed from his prior conciliatory position—and, in effect, set the stage for the litigation that followed—with the following statement:
"You can call at the B.L.N, office for documentation of our
amendment actions as I will provide you with none."

(Exh. P-8)

(Emphasis added)
On interrogation at the trial, William Bown responded:
Q.

And so, in other words, we were to wait until you did

something to clear the title and that's about what it amounted
to, wasn't it?
A#

It was just that you could call there to find out what

I had done.

You demanded I furnish you with proof and I Just re-

sponded that you can go pick up the proof yourself.
(R.113 )
On April 13, 1992, appellants checked with the B.L.M. office
(Exh. P-13) in Salt Lake City, and on April 28 and May 1, 1992,
they traveled to Brigham City and inspected the files and records
in the Box Elder Recorders Office, but appellees had done nothing
to clear the title of appellants' claims by "amendment proceedures"
or otherwise.

Thereupon, after waiting more than three months, on

May 1, 1992, appellants filed their Complaint to quiet title, based
on slander-of-title allegations, seeking compensatory and punitive
damages, and other relief.
-6-

Summons and Complaint were served on Ronald L. Bown on May 6,
1992 (R. 009), and on Preston E. Bown and Jeffrey C. Bown on May 29,
1992 (R. 010 and 01l) f but William L. Bown could not be found*
However, after Ronald had been served, William signed, and secured
the signatures of the other three appellees upon, a relinquishment
of the Boulder Haven No* 1 mining claim and filed it with the B.L.M.
office in Salt Lake City on May 18, 1992—12 days after Ronald had
been served.

Appellees took no action respecting their filing in

the Box Elder County Recorderfs Office*
On August 5f 1992, a private process server served Summons and
Complaint (R. 008) on William L. Bown, who, upon being questioned
at trial as to his whereabouts while being sought for several
months, gave the following response:
Q#

And why did you wait nearly three months to take any

action?
A*

Well, basically at that time in my life there were some

other things going on that took a little more precedence as far
as I was concerned.

I knew in my heart, knowing mining laws and

other things, I knew what my intentions would have been and I
knew the actual harm, if any, that I had done to the title of
your claim and also there were other things happening ...n
(R. 114)
(Underlining added)
On August 10, 1992, after William had contacted his attorney
(R. 118), appellees executed an "Abandonment and Disclaimer of
Mining Claim"(which appellants prepared), and the same was recorded
on that date with the Box Elder County Recorder by appellants•

-7-
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This Exhibit P-13* modified as indicated with red additions5 was
furnished to the trial court (R.062) along with appellants Objections to proposed Findings of Fact and in support of Motion for
Judgment in the amount of title-clearing costs: $2,334*39*
-8-

the encumbrance on the title of appellants' mining claims was finally removed. (Exh. P-10)
Appellees refused to pay appellants anything by way of reimbursement for their expenses and time spent prior to August 10, 1992,
in clearing title to the latters' mining claim 3 (R«145-146 ) , so
the matter proceeded to trial before Judge Hyde, sitting without a
jury, on Feb. 23, 1993.
At the close of the trial, Judge Hyde announced that he would
not award any punitive damages but that "the question of whether
you are entitled to attorney fees to clear that title I'm not prepared to rule on at this time and I will consider that."

(R.149 )

(Underlining added)
Cn Feb. 26, 1993, after reviewing the parties' Trial Briefs,
Judge Hyde issued a Memorandum Decision, ruling as follows:
"The only matter not ruled upon at trial was Plaintiff's
request for attorney fees.
I hold that the case of Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P 2d 467
(1992) is controlling. That case holding 'That Pro Se Litigants should not recover Attorney Fees regardless of their
professional status' is applicable to this case."
(R. 056)
As soon thereafter as appellees' counsel prepared and served
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, appellants immediately prepared and served their Objections to the
same (R. 058-059), together with a Motion for Judgment (in favor
of appellants) in the sum of at least $2,334.39, which amount represented necessary out-of-pocket expenses and the reasonable value
of their services up to and including August 10, 1992—but not
thereafter—as damages incurred in clearing title to their mining
claims. (See breakdown of Exh. P-13 charges on opposite page)

-9-

Appellants contended, as they had previously maintained in
their trial Briefs, that Smith v. Batchelor did not preclude their
recovery in the circumstances.
Appellants' Objections and Motion were filed with the Court
on March 11, 1993 (R« 058), together with courtesy copies for
Judge Hyde, and appellees filed no response.

Without further rul-

ing, and disregarding appellants1 Objections and Motion, the trial
Court signed and entered the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Judgment, as submitted by appellees, on March 191 1993$ dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.

(R* 067-068)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellants, appearing as pro se plaintiffs in the trial court,
were denied their right under the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution to recover cause-ofaction damages for a wrong committed against them and their
properties by appellees.

-10-

ARGUMENT
I.
APPELLANTS PROVED THAT THEY SUSTAINED RECOVERABLE DAMAGES
BY REASON OF APPELLEES1 OVERLAPPING MINERAL PILING.
Appellants1 Complaint (R.00l)alleged ownership of their two
placer and millsite mining claims (including legal descriptions
established by a certified U. S. mineral survey), that portions
of both claims were located in the Vest % of the NEK of Section IS,
Tp. 13 N., R. 13 W., S. L. B. & M., U. S. Survey, that appellees
recorded and filed their overlapping Boulder Haven #1 mining claim
of April 2, 1990 (which included appellants1 cabin, rock bins,
storage garages, yard, crushing plant and headquarters area—approximately 5 acres).
Appellees admitted the foregoing allegations, but denied further allegations, claiming that their claim was valid as to the
portion of the 80 acres that was not overlapped and that their
recording and filing were made in good faith.

With respect to

appellants1 claim for punitive an^ compensatory (special) damages
incurred in removing the cloud from their title, appellees asserted
that appellants sustained "no loss."

(R. 014)

As set forth in the Statement of Facts, the testimony of Kim
G. Fuller (R# 91-92,98)

and the admissions of appellee William L.

Eown (S. 130 ) conclusively established that appellees failed to
erect a Notice of Location or to monument any of the corners of
their alleged claim on the ground as required by law:

-11-

4-0-1-2.

Discovery monument—Notice of Location—Contents«

The locator at the time of making the discovery of such vein
or lode must erect a monument at the place of discovery, and
post thereon his notice of location, which shall contain:
(5) If a placer or millsite claim, the number of acres
or superficial feet claimed, and such a description of the claim
or mill site, located by reference to some natural object or permanent monument, as will identify the claim or mill site.
4-0-1-3.

Boundaries to be marked.

Mining claims and mill sites must be distinctly marked on the
ground so that the boundaries thereof can be readily traced.
And see Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture, Inc. (1957)* 6 U, 2d 3?3,
314 P. 2d 840, where, 35 years earlier, "claim Jumpers11 attempted
to acquire a portion of the northwest corner of this same placer
claim.
Although William Bown attempted to explain, in terms of what
would be found (R# 125)

in

areas where U.S. government surveys

exist in a feeble effort to "monument" his claim, his vague explanation was inadequate and wrong.

The U. S. survey system monuments

the four cardinal corners of each section (640 acres, more or less);
in addition, between each of the four one-mile courses going around
each section, monuments are placed at intervals of one-half mile
(called quarter corners).
uments.

Thus, each section will have eight mon-

And since the WJ4 of the NE# of Section 18 is 80 acres,

the only government monument that would be present would be found
at the NV corner of the 80 acres (i.e., at the north quarter corner
of Section 18). And it was not until the early summer of 1992,
when the U. S. mineral surveyor was working the area, that Kim G.
Fuller and appellant Glen E. Fuller located that monument, sans any
evidence of a mineral monument of any kind. ( R.94f X48-149)
-12-

In the absence of proper posting and monumentation, appellees1
contentions as set forth in their Answer (5,013) and Trial Brief
that their claim was "valid" and that they were "junior appropriators" (over and above a .millsite claim, no less, without citing
authority), all must fail. Their "paper claim" was void; in short,
appellees were "claim jumpers."
Although appellee William Bown contended that the overlap
created by his Boulder Haven #1 "claim" was unintentional and accidental, the background facts support a different scenario.

Be-

fore filing his "claim" he went to the BLM office and .examined the
Fuller file and (only) the map therein accompanying (only) appellants' placer claim (R« 12?, 134

and Exhs. P-ll and D-2). Curious-

ly, he failed to give any reason for neglecting to further examine
the file, which also contained appellants1 contiguous, and easterly,
millsite claim.

He concluded that his "claim" would not overlap

any part of appellants1 placer claim, but he saw no reason to further examine the file.

(Exh. P-2 and R. 127, 131 f 134-135)

The evidence must be assessed as establishing that William
Bown was well aware that appellants' millsite area was within the
W% of the NEK of Section 18 and that, whether believing that appellants' claim was faulty or that it did not exist as to that
area, he intentionally and deliberately filed upon the millsite
area*
Q. (Mr. Fuller)

What was your purpose to check the files in

the first place?
A.

To make sure I wasn't going to be overlapping.

I knew where your claims were basically within a hundred yards,
-13-

I knev/ that, common sense, because I'd been there a lot.

I pulled

that map to make sure we werent1 clipping into your claim.
Q.

You've been over there a lot, havenft you, on our claims?

A.

You bet.
(H.135)

Q.

So you've known that area quite well, haven't you?

A.

I know the area ...as far as site pretty well.
(H.136 )

William Bown's intimate knowledge of the millsite area certainly made him cognizant of the fact that there were substantial
operations and improvements located east of appellants1 placer
claim.

He had also been a good friend of Gary Mullard (Northern

Stone Supply, Inc.) from about the time of the filing

of appellees

claim on April 2, 1990 (R.119) > and William Bown was aware that
prospective purchasers were interested in appellants' properties.
Moreover, he knew that Mullard was interested in "green" stone
(R. 121) and, had he found a flaw in, or no filing of, a claim to
appellants' millsite area, he would have been in a strong "bargaining position" if appellants were to make a sale.
A.

(William Bown)

He (Mullard) needed green, he wanted to

get involved in the green, and T tried to set him up and that * s
all it was.
( R.120 )
Underlining added
If appellees' filing on the millsite area had been the only
filing of record, or if appellants1 millsite claim had been defective for any reason, appellees could have demanded access through
appellants1 placer claim and across the Dugway Road so as to get
-14-

into the upper reaches of Rock Canyon, from which they had been
barred despite three prior unsuccessful attempts (R# 110-111)^
better yet, they could have claimed title to, and negotiated the
sale of, appellants1 millsite area and all of its improvements•
Unfortunately for appellees, their further research at the
BLM office after receiving appellants1 letter of January 24, 1992
(Exh. P-7) revealed (R« 134)

that appellants had filed and re-

corded their millsite claim (Exh. P-12), that appellees1 overlapping "paper claim" was of no value to them even if it had been valid.,
and that any plan that appellees may have concocted had come to
naught.
If this Court should think that mining "claims" are always
filed for the sole purpose of extracting minerals from the ground,
a different motive

also existed in the case of Springer v. South-

ern Pacific Co, (1926), 67 U. 590, 248 P. 819.
Appellants provided the trial court and opposing counsel with
a detailed breakdown of time (and its reasonable value), expenses,
and the nature of necessary steps involved in clearing title to
their mining claims (Exh. P-15), corrraencing on Sept. 19* 1991i with
an on-site examination of appellees' "claim" area, and extending
through the filing of the Complaint on May 1, 1992, and terminating on August 10, 1992, when they were provided with the final
document (Exh. P-10) that enabled appellants to remove the cloud
from their title on the Box Elder County records.

Exhibit 13 also

provided a time-and-services summary of steps from and after August 10, 1992, in bringing th_? matter to trial*
Exhibit P-13 (and see corroborating testimony—R. 13T8-142 )

-15-

classified appellants' pro se services according to three separate categories, using modest hourly charges for each*

As an

attorney, only 14 hours were charged by appellant Glen E. Fuller
to legal services up to and including August 10, 1992, the balance
to that date being allocated to "paralegal" and "surveyor assistant"
categories at $30 and $45 per-hour charges, respectively*

Total

services and expenses in clearing title (through August 10, 1992)
were computed in the sum of 1*2,334.39* (Exh. P-13

and

H. 138-142)

Although this Court may feel reluctant to express an opinion
as to v/hether appellants out-of-pocket expenses and their opinion of
the reasonable value of necessary services expended are fair and
justified, it should be noted that appellants, appearing pro se,
were certainly in a position to best minimize trial-clearing efforts and costs than would have been the case had other similar
professional assistance been secured.

"Further, and certainly an

element that this Court should recognize, although appellant Glen
E. Puller was interrogated by counsel for appellees on other matters, not a single item on Exhibit P-13, or his corroborating
testimony (R*138-142),was inquired into or challenged on crossexamination, by brief, on argument, or otherwise.

The evidence

on special damages stands uncontradicted; the only issue is whether
appellants1 recovery is denied solely by reason of the trial court!s
interpretation of the effect of a single Utah court case*
Professional services are involved in most cases being tried.
today.

Doctors testify in personal injury matters and provide medi-

cal services; appraisers furnish written opinions of value and
testify concerning the same, mechanical engineers inspect and testify concerning machinery and eouipment defects—the list is endless.
-16-

Lawyers1 services are invariably utilized, both in and out of
court, in clearing title to property.

As such, those expenses (or

their reasonable value) become an element of damages*

This fact

has been recognized in two Utah slander-of-title cases:

Dows e v•

Doris Trust Co, ( W ? ) , 116 U. 106, 208 P. 2d 956, and Olsen v.
Kidman (195D, 120 U. 44-3, 235 P. 2d 510.
Selected excerpts taken from the two referenced cases, supported by the Restatement of Torts and 50 Am Jur 2d, are set forth
in the following sub-topics:
PUBLICATION BY RECORDING
"Liability may be predicated on the filing or recording of
a false instrument purporting to affect the title to property,
such as an affidavit, ..." 50 Am. Jur 2d, Libel and Slander,
Section 541.
FALSITY OF THE WORDS
11

It is not necessary that the publisher of a disparaging
statement know or believe it to be false nor is it necessary
that as a reasonable man he should know or believe that it
is untrue. Furthermore, it is immaterial that he has reasonable grounds for his belief in its truth. As in an action for
defamation, if the other essentials to liability are present,
the publisher of disparaging matter takes the risk that it
is untrue. " Olsen v. Kidman. 120 Utah 443, 235 P.2d 510,
513 ( 1951), as quoted from Restatement on Torts, Section
625.
n

Slander of title is effected by one who witliout privilege
publishes untrue disparaging statements with respect to the
property of another under such circumstances as would lead
a reasonable person to foresee that a prospective purchaser
or lessee thereof might abandon his intentions ... In order
to commit the tort acjtu^l malice or ill will is unnecessary.
( Citing authority)"1 " Olsen v. Kidman^120-Utah 443 , 235
P.2d 510, 512 ( 1951).
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PECUNIARY LOSS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES
" Thus the vendibility of land, chattels or intangible
things may be impaired when a statement makes them
appear less desirable for purchase, lease or other
dealings than they actually are. But the liability
does not accrue until the publication of the disparaging
matter operates as a substantial factor in determining
the decision of a prospective purchaser or other interested
person, to refrain from buying or otherwise acquiring the
thing in question or causes the owner to incur the expense
of such legal proceedings as may be available or necessary
to remove the cloud upon the vendibility that is cast upon
it by the publication'.' ( Emphasis added) Restatement of
Torts 2d, Section 632.

"It is defendant's contention that plaintiff having failed to
allege and prove a particular sale or sales which had been
lost because of its action that plaintiff had failed to
present for the consideration of the court, an essential
element of the action for slander of title, i.e., a
pecuniary loss. It is defendant's contention that attorney's
fees are not recoverable as special damages and that such
damages can only be proved by the loss of a particular sale
which must be alleged as well as proved. It cites as
authority for this contention the cases of McGuinness v.
Hargiss, 56 Wash. 162, 105 P. 233, 21 Ann. Cas. 220,
Hubbard v. Scott, 85 Or. 1, 166 P. 33 and City of
Shreveport, v. Kahn, 194 La. 55, 193 So.461. All of the
above cases have held that attorneys' fees are not recoverable in an action for slander of title. However, we
are not impressed with the reasoning of those cases and
others to the same effect. The action of slander of title
is based on a wrongful act but for which the plaintiff would
not have had to incur any expense, either for costs or for
attorney's fees. The reasoning in Chesebro v. Powers, 78
Mich. 472, 44 N.W. 290, is more in harmony with justice."
Dowse v. Doris Trust Co.. 116 Utah 106, 208 P. 2d 956, 958 ( 1949)
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"Attorney's fees are certainly a reasonable expense of
litigation," Dowse v. Doris Trust Co.. 116 Utah 106, 208
P. 2d 956, 959 ( 1949). In accord is Olsen v. Kidman,
120 Utah 443, 235 P. 2d
510 ( 1951).

11

Section 633^ Pecuniary Loss ( l)The pecuniary loss for
which a publisher of injurious falsehood is subject to
liability is restricted to
(a) The pecuniary loss that results directly and
immediately from the effect on the conduct of
third persons, including impairment of vendibility
or value caused by disparagement, and

(2)

(h) The expen.se of measures reasonably necessary to
counteract the publication, including litigation to
remove the doubts cast upon vendibility or value
by disparagement.
(Emphasis added)
"
Restatement of Torts

2d, Sec, 633.

DISPARAGING STATEMENT MAY BE ANY
UNFOUNDED CLAIM
"To be disparaging a statement need not be a complete denial
of title in others, but may be any unfounded claim of an
interest in the property which throws doubt upon its ownership.
( citing authority)" Olsen v. Kidman. 120 Utah 443, 235 P.2d
510, 513 { 1951).
11

Thus if the defendant says that the plaintiff's title to a
particular piece of land is not good, the plaintiff must prove
that his title is marketable since the test of a good title
is its marketability. If, on the other hand, the disparagement
consists of a statement that there is a particular defect in
the other's title, the other as plaintiff need only show that
his title is free from that defect. ff Restatement of Torts
Second, Section 634.
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES
11

The defendant real estate broker had no lien. The
plaintiff's title was slandered when the purported
lien was recorded without privilege to do so, ...
The evidence also supports the award of • • •
•. • punitive and exemplary damages•,f
Olsen v.Kidman,120 Utah 443, 235 P. 2d 510, 513 ( 1951)

That punitive damages may be awarded in an action for
slander of title see Hopkins v. Drowne. 21 R. I. 20,
41 A. 567. n Dowse v. Doris Trust Co.. 116 Utah 106,
208 P. 2d 956, 959 ( 1949).

The facts of this case come within the umbrella of the law,
both as to special damages and punitive damages.

In order to re-

move the cloud of appellees' claim from appellants1 properties,
as provided for and required by their Quarry Sales Agreement
(Exh. P-4), appellants were required to expend money and effort.
II.
THE UTAH CASE OP SMITH V. BATCHELOR DOES NOT PRECLUDE APPEEIAMTS1 EECOVERY OF DAMAGES BECAUSE OF THEIR PRO SE APPEARANCE
AT TIBTATi>
Implicit in the trial courtfs Memorandum Decision (R.056)
holding that Smith v. Batchelor (Utah 1992), 832 P. 2d 467* was
controlling in this case, was a recognition that appellants had
in fact clearly established damages but that they could not recover due to the technicality of having handled their litigation
pro se*

Appellants contend the rule of that case is otherwise•

Smith v. Batchelor involved an employment-type claim
based upon the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (and the corresponding Utah Payment of Wages Act) for back wages and overtime pay,
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Plaintiff, an attorney appearing pro se, was granted relief on
the substantive portion of his claim for back wages and overtime,
but he was denied recovery for the reasonable value of his attorney
services in handling and litigating the claim as expressly provided
for under the FLSA (i.e., procedural relief).
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the FLSA provision allowing
for attorney's fees as follows:
We decline to join these courts in allowing pro se attorneys
to recover fees while lay pro se litigants go uncompensated•
In our view, such a result discriminates between lay and attorney litigants. It is a sufficient advantage to a lawyerlitigant that he or she is capable of competently presenting
his or her claim without the need of retained counsel. Because we are loath to enhance that advantage by giving the
lawyer-litigant recovery, not only as a successful party, but
also as that party's attorney, we hold that pro se litigants
should not recover attorney fees, regardless of their professional status.
Although the final language of the decision, if taken out of
context, might be construed as barring all pro se litigants from
recovering attorney fees in every manner of case, it is clear that
the decision is limited to statute-provided attorney fees of a
procedural nature where discrimination would allow attorney-pro-se
litigants to recover such fees but lay-pro-se litigants could not
recover such fees.

As for the right to recover on the basic

claim, however, Smith v. Batchelor clearly recognizes that an
attorney pro se litigant

can

recover damages; in fact,

our Utah Constitution extends this right to attorney-pro-se litigants and lay-pro-se litigants alike.

Justice Stewart, dissenting

in Smith v. Batchelor, accepted the majority's "discriminati/on"
position, but pointed out that it was misplaced and inapplicable.
No other case can be found which, if analyzed carefully under its controlling law and facts, is identical to Smith v. Batchelor,
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Further, for the trial court in this case to accept the all-encompassing, out-of-context and broad statement from Smith v«
Batchelor as controlling all manner of attorney pro se appearances,
the result would effectively bar all persons from their constitutional right to represent themselves in court as guaranteed by
Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec* 11:
Sec. .11. (Courts open—Redress of injuries.)
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.
Further, the foregoing constitutional right, coupled with
Art. I, Sec. 7 (due process) and Art. I, Sec. 24- (uniform operation of the laws), in total effect, would be nullified and circumvented if litigants could represent themselves (pro se) in
court but would be denied all manner of recovery because of their
pro se appearance.

That result is exactly what took place in

this case under the trial court's decision and judgment.
Cases can be found from other jurisdictions which seemingly
represent a "split of authority11 of sorts as to whether pro se
litigants (be they lay persons or attorneys) can recover "attorney fees" in litigation.

However, each case must be carefully

analyzed because the critical factor in nearly every case involves
a rule of court, a statute, or a contractual provision providing
for attorney fees (i.e., as procedural "costs") to be awarded
in addition to the substantive award constituting the gist of the
action.

The foregoing distinction is critical*
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As illustrative, an annotation at 78 A*L.R. 3rd 1119 deals
with the right of a pro se litigant to recover attorney's fees
against an opposing party as an elementof costs* And, as previously mentioned, since at common law attorney's fees could not be
recovered as costs against an opponent in litigation, there must
be a rule of court, statute, or an underlying agreement in order
that they be allowed in such situations. 20 Am Jur 2d, Costs, #72.
Numerous "cost-type" lay-pro-se and attorney-pro-se litigant
cases providing for "attorney's fees" under one of the three mentioned categories were cited in Smith V. Batchelor—itself a
"cost-type" attorney's fee situation controlled by statute*
In comparing this case with Smith v. Batchelor, we find no
discrimination problem involving a lay-pro-se litigant and an
attorney-pro-se litigant; nor does this case involve the recovery
of "costs" or their equivalent pursuant to some court rule, statute, or underlying agreement—procedural relief*

Stated again,

this case seeks damages resulting from taking steps necessary to
remove an encumbrance placed on the title to real property*

And,

as set forth in Dowse v. Doris Trust Co* and Olsen v. Kidman,
necessary title-clearing expenses, including attorney's fees,
are included in the measure of damages.
on substantive rights

Therefore, damages based

distinguishes this case even further from

the pro-se-attorney problem discussed in Smith v* Batchelor.
And, since Smith's pro se appearance did not deny him recovery
of back pay and overtime, the rationale of that case actually
supports plaintiffs-appellants' position in this case.
Nor has an examination of any of the few cases denying recovery of attorney's fees as "costs" pursuant to rule of court,
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statute, "underlying agreement, or common law, revealed a single
instance where damages based upon the underlying substantive right
involved have ever been denied by reason of either an attorney-prose or a lay-pro-se appearance•

To have done so would have encount-

ered constitutional objections in almost every state and a possible encounter with the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Cases awarding pro se attorney's fees have abandoned any rule
or requirement that such services be supported by actual cash payments; instead, the test of the reasonable value of the services
rendered has been adopted by the great majority of the courts.
In the case of Renfrew v. Loysen (1986), 222 Cal. Reporter 413, a
long line of California cases (many of which were quoted by other
courts) were overruled and rejected with the following reasoning:
The logic of past decisions that do not allow an attorney
to recover fees when he appears on his own behalf is unclear.
Although such an attorney does not pay a fee or incur any financial liability therefor to another, his time spent in preparing his case is not somehow rendered less valuable because
he is representing himself rather than a third party. Accordingly, it appears he should be compensated when he represents himself if he would otherwise be entitled to such
compensation.
It seems obvious that the prosecution of an ...action by an
attorney acting pro se involves a tangible commitment of time
and skills—a lawyer's only 'stock in trade1—having a substantial economic value which realistically could have been
available for other gainful application.
And from Winer v. Jonal Corp. (Montana 1975),5^5 P. 2d lo94:
The better rule is that a party who appears for himself,
and is himself an attorney or counselor at law, is entitled to
be awarded the same costs as he would be entitled to had he
employed another.
In a case which analyzed the pros and cons of allowing an
attorney to recover for his pro se efforts, the New York case of
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McMahon v, Schwartz (N.Y. 1981), 4-38 N.Y.S. 2d 215, made the following observations:
The plaintiff, like any other professional man, is paid for
his time and services, and if he renders them in the management
and trial of his own cause it may amount to as much pecuniary
loss or damage to him as if he paid another attorney for doing
it.
It can make no difference to a party who, by law, is bound
to pay costs including attorney's fees, whether the fees are
to be paid to an attorney representing himself or another
attorney employed by him.
III.
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED ADDITIONAL ATTORNEYS FEES
AS DAMAGES ON APPEAL.
Recognizing that attorney's fees and court costs and other
expenditures necessary to clear title in a slander of title case
is an equitable concept; recovering those expenditures is another matter. Too often, as in this case, it plainly appears that
a separate trial and its attendant expenses could easily exceed the
amount recoverable as damages under Dowse and Kidman.

And even,

as here, if the expenses and the costs of litigation are combined
in a single action (Exh. P-13) and segregated, the trial-recovery
portion of the total will exceed the title-clearing portion.
There is no "cost-type" rule of court, statute or agreement that
will compensate appellants for the trial-recovery portion of their
expenditures in this case.
If the trial court had awarded appellants judgment for their
title-clearing expenditures in the sum of $2,334-.39* appellants
would have recovered 50% of their total title-clearing and trial
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expenditures (assuming that they could collect on the judgment)—
gaining exactly nothing,

But what if, as here, judgment for their

title-clearing expenditures be denied at the trial court level and
they are forced to appeal?
Inasmuch as the litigation expenses necessary to clear the
title to property in a slander of title action where a plaintiff
prevails are not finalized until the judgment is affirmed on appeal
(or, conversely, where a plaintiff is denied recovery at trial
and must appeal to secure what should have been the judgment),
appellate courts have recognized that attorney's fees on appeal
should be awarded as an extension of title-clearing damages•
In the case of Hamilton v. Telex Corporation (Okla* 1981),
625 P« 2d 106, where suit was brought to recover attorney's fees
both under a contract and a statutory provision, it was held that
pro se

attorney's fees should be awarded both at trial stage and

on appeal.

The case involved a combination of regular legal ser-

vices and also legal services under the statute.

Although a

"cost-type" statutory provision for attorney's fees was involved,
the case is basically similar to this case in its reasoning and
result.
Even more to the point, in the slander of title action addressed in Olsen v. Kidman the Utah Supreme Court ruled on appeal
as follows:
The judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial
court to assess as damages the reasonable amount of attorney's
fees in defending the judgment on appeal.
(Underlining added)
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CONCLUSION
By their very nature, slander-of-title cases usually require
proof that contains factual circumstances sufficient to justify
both compensatory and punitive damages.

However, once the degree

of proof has established a cause of action, it is often difficult
to present additional evidence of sufficient wrongdoing necessary
to convince a trier of fact that punitive damages should be awarded.
Be that as it may, in this case the reasonable expenditures of
clearing title in the amount of $2,334.39 are undisputed.
As for the remainder of the expenditures in the amount of
$2,290.00 (as shown on Exh. P-13), there is no specific rule of
court, "cost-type" statute, or underlying agreement providing for
trial-related expenditures in this case.

On the other hand, appell-

ants submit that, considering all of the facts and circumstances
in this case, appellees1 defenses to appellants1 monetary claims
and allegations at trial were without merit and were taken in bad
faith.

As such, undisputed trial-related expenditures in the

amount of $2,290.00 should also be awarded to appellants pursuant
to 78-27-56, Utah Code Anno. 1953* as amended.
Because of the necessity of having to maintain this appeal—
and as expressly set forth in Olsen v. Kidman—appellants are entitled to pro se attorney's fees on appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, appellants submit that this Court make and enter
its decision and order that appellants have judgment for titleclearing expenditures in the amount of $2,334.39 and trial-related
expenditures in the sum of $2,290.00, both amounts being undisputed;
and, further, that this matter be remanded to the trial court to
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assess, as damages, the reasonable amount of pro se attorney's
fees in securing judgment on appeal.
Respectfully submitted*

^^^

Glen E. Fuller (pro se)

Connie J. Fuller (pro se)
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
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